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Abstract—Game theory is a very profound study on distributed
decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by
many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain
strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent’s private
behaviors, which might not be practical. In this work, we focused
on two Nobel winning concepts, the Nash equilibrium and the
correlated equilibrium. Specifically, we successfully reached the
correlated equilibrium outside the convex hull of the Nash equi-
libria with our proposed deep reinforcement learning algorithm.
With the correlated equilibrium probability distribution, we also
propose a mathematical model to inverse the calculation of the
correlated equilibrium probability distribution to estimate the
opponent’s payoff vector. With those payoffs, deep reinforcement
learning learns why and how the rational opponent plays, instead
of just learning the regions for corresponding strategies and
actions. Through simulations, we showed that our proposed
method can achieve the optimal correlated equilibrium and
outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium with limited
interaction among players.
Index Terms—correlated equilibrium, deep learning, game
theory, joint distribution, machine learning, neural network,
reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is the study of mathematical models regarding
the rationality decision making strategic interaction. Origi-
nally, game theory addressed the two-player zero-sum non-
cooperative games where each participant’s gains or losses are
exactly balanced by those of the other participants [1]. Today,
game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations
such as cooperative game [2], contract theory, auction theory,
matching game, dynamic game and more [3], [4].
The main idea for game theory is for each rational player to
maximize his or her utility. Take the Nobel winning Nash equi-
librium solution concept for example. The Nash equilibrium
solution concept, named after the mathematician John Forbes
Nash Jr., is a solution of a non-cooperative game involving two
or more players. A Nash equilibrium in the game is where no
player has utility increment by changing only their strategy
[5]. However, the solution under the Nash equilibrium might
be far from the centralized solution. Hence, in 1974, there
is another mathematician named Robert Aumann discussed
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another Nobel winning solution concept called correlated
equilibrium [6]. The idea in the correlated equilibrium concept
is that all players will choose an action according to a public
signal. If all player is satisfied by the recommended strategy,
the distribution is called a correlated equilibrium distribution
[7]. With this concept, players can achieve higher utility in the
game since they consider the joint distribution instead of the
marginal distribution as the Nash equilibrium. However, there
does not exist a distributed strategy on how to reach correlated
equilibrium outside the Nash equilibrium convex hull since
there does not exist a clear way on how to design the public
signal for the player to obtain. Some existing works using
non-regret learning [8] can only achieve the Nash equilibrium
convex hull but cannot learn the better correlated equilibrium.
The reason that the players in a non-cooperative game are
unable to achieve the correlated equilibrium is due to the
fact that they are unable to mine some of the information
out from the public signal provided to them. Fortunately, a
technique called machine learning was developed for studying
the underlying factor of the data. Many works, such as [9]–
[12] and more, showed the robustness of the machine learning
technique for data mining tasks. However, even today, the link
of machine learning with game theory is seldom studied.
Motivated by the above facts, we proposed a policy-based
deep reinforcement learning model to determine the strategy
to reach equilibrium under limited information given to the
player. We then estimate the payoffs of other players via
our proposed mathematical model. Once we have all the
payoffs from the other players, we can determine the correlated
equilibrium between other players without them interacting
with each other. Thus, the contribution we made in this work
can be summarized as follows:
• We first define the public signal in the system for the
player to obtain that contains limited information of the
players.
• With limited information, players will start to interact
with the environment. By applying our proposed deep
reinforcement learning model, the player not only can
understand the structure of the environment but also learn
the joint distribution among all of the players when
exploring the environment. In the end, the players can
reach a correlated equilibrium where no one wants to
deviate.
• With the correlated equilibrium probability distribution
that all players satisfied with, we proposed a mathemat-
ical model that combines the concept of the correlated
2equilibrium and the force of tension to estimate the payoff
vectors of other players.
• By knowing the payoff vector of other players in the
system, we could compute the correlated equilibrium.
In other words, with those payoff vectors, deep rein-
forcement learning learns why and how the rational
opponent plays, instead of just learning the regions for
corresponding strategies and actions.
• This paper combines the game theory with machine
learning in the sense that the proposed machine learning
learns what is the game player’s payoff, instead of just
categorizing the strategies of actions according to the
current situation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss the basic concept in the Nash equilibrium
and correlated equilibrium concepts along with our system
model and problem formulation. Next, in Section III, we
show how the player interacts with the environment with our
proposed policy-based deep reinforcement learning model and
learn the joint distribution among the players. In the same
section, we also proposed a mathematical model to estimate
the information of the opponent players. Next, we show the
numerical results for our proposed methods in Section IV.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BASIC EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT
In this section, we will first go through the basic concept of
the Nash equilibrium and the correlated equilibrium in Section
II-A. In Section II-B, we will study the relationship between
the environment and the players in our system model. Finally,
in Section II-C, we will discuss the problem formulation.
A. Nash Equilibrium and Correlated Equilibrium Basics
The Nash equilibrium is a solution concept for a non-
cooperative game for two or more players [5]. The equilibrium
outcome of a non-cooperative game is one where no player
wants to deviate from his or her chosen strategy after consid-
ering the opponent’s decision. In other words, an individual
cannot increment his or her utility from unilaterally changing
his or her strategies, assuming the other players remain their
strategies. There might be none or multiple Nash equilibrium
in a non-cooperative game depends on the setup of the game
and the strategies used by each player. A formal definition of
Nash equilibrium is as follows.
Definition II.1. An I-player game is characterized by an
action set Φi. Let Bi (ς−i) ⊂ Φi be the set of player pi’s best
response strategy against ς−i ∈ Φ−1. ς∗ = (ς∗1 , . . . , ς
∗
I ) ∈ Φ
is a Nash equilibrium if ς∗ ∈ Bi
(
ς∗
−i
)
for every i ∈ I .
On the other hand, the correlated equilibrium is also a
solution concept that is more general than the Nash equilib-
rium. The idea of the correlated equilibrium solution concept
is that each player chooses their decision according to their
observation of a public signal [13]. A strategy assigns an action
to every possible decision set Dh a player can choose. If
no player wants to deviate from the recommended strategy,
Figure 1: Game of Chicken Decision Set Layout
the distribution is called a correlated equilibrium. A formal
definition is as follows.
Definition II.2. An I-player strategic game (I,Φi, ui) is
characterized by an action set Φi and utility function ui for
each player i. when player i chooses strategy ςi ∈ Φi and the
remaining players choose a strategy profile ς−i described by
the I − 1 tuple. Then the player i’s utility is ui (ςi, ς−i). A
strategy modification for player i is a function φi : Φi → Φi.
That is φi tells player i to modify his or her behavior by
playing action φi (ςi) when instructed by play ςi. Let (Ω,Ψ)
be a countable probability space. For each player i, let Fi
be his or her information partition, qi be i’s posterior and let
si : Ω → Φi, assigning the same value to states in the same
cell of i’s information partition. Then ((Ω,Ψ) , Fi, si) is the
correlated equilibrium of the strategic game (I,Φi, ui) if it
satisfies the condition
∑
ω∈Ω
qi (ω)ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω)) ≥∑
ω∈Ω
qi (ω)ui (φi (si (ω)) , s−i (ω))
(1)
for every player i and for every strategy modification φi.
B. System Model
There are two major components in our system model the
players and the environment. We can consider the environment
is a set of states S where each state sk = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρH)
is a unique tuple which contains the probabilities for each
decision set Dh ∈ D for h = 1, 2, . . . , H , where D is a set
of permutation of all player’s decisions. In other words, state
sk contains a probability distribution of the decisions in D.
The order of the players’ decision in decision set Dh will
always starts from player p1 to player pI . Take the game of
chicken (Fig. 1) for example. The set D contains total four
elements where D1, D2, D3, and D4 are set to (Chicken,
Chicken), (Chicken, Dare), (Dare, Chicken), and (Dare, Dare),
respectively.
On the other hand, there is a set of players P in our system
model where P contains a total of I players where 2 ≤ I ∈ Z.
Each player pi has their own payoff vector Vi, policy πi, and
a set of actions A. The payoff vector Vi contains rewards vi,h
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that player pi will receive when agreeing on performing the
decision set Dh in the game. The sum of all the elements in
payoff vector Vi has to be equal to one. This allows us to
determine the ratio between each element when we estimate
the payoff vector for the other players in Section III-E. Next,
the policy πi is the behavior on how player pi will interact with
the environment. Policy πi states that player pi will follow a
certain probability distribution to choose an action aj ∈ A
to perform based on the current state sk that the player is
currently in and the previous state sk−1 that the player came
from. The action set A is the permutation of increase, decrease,
or no change on the probability of each of the decision set Dh
for 1 ≤ h ≤ H−1. The amount of increasing or decreasing the
probability is set to be ϑ ∈ (0, 1]. The reason why the action
does not contain the change of decision DH is due to the fact
that the probability distribution of all decisions in D needs to
sum up to one. Hence, we can get the probability of DH by
subtracting the summation of all other decisions’ probabilities
from one. In addition, even though the probability adjustment
amount ϑ is a constant, if the probability is out of the range of
[0, 1] after increasing or decreasing the amount of ϑ, depending
on the action, the probability will only increase or decrease
a certain amount so the probability will still within the range
of [0, 1]. Next, depends on the action the player chooses, the
player will be moving to another state. The detail on how the
player will interact with the environment will be discussed in
Section III-B.
Moreover, according to Robert J. Aumann, the correlated
equilibrium is a general form of strategy randomization than
mixing. This means that the solution of the Nash equilibrium is
within the convex haul of the correlated equilibrium. Hence,
we set a restriction where there must be at least two Nash
equilibrium sets in the system. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium
sets have to be found using the mixed strategy. This restriction
future express as the rewards in Vi for player pi will be
unique values when the decisions are fixed for other players.
Otherwise, there will be no solution to the mixed strategy. Take
Fig. 2 as an example. The rewards constraint is that v1,1 6= v1,3
and v1,2 6= v1,4 for player 1, and v2,1 6= v2,2 and v2,3 6= v2,4
for player 2.
Figure 3: Nash Equilibrium vs. Correlated Equilibrium
C. Problem Formulation
Although players could achieve correlated equilibrium to
obtain a higher reward by using the correlated strategy instead
of the mixed strategy in a non-cooperative game, there exist
few challenges within the correlated equilibrium solution
concept itself. First, as mentioned in Section II-A, the cor-
related equilibrium concept is a more general form of strategy
randomization than the mixing Nash equilibrium strategy. We
can see the relation between the correlated equilibrium convex
haul and the Nash equilibrium convex hull from the game of
chicken shows in Fig. 3. Although it is true that the reward
obtained by the player might be higher when applying the
correlated strategy rather than the Nash equilibrium strategy.
However, at the same time, this also means there is a proba-
bility that the player can obtain a lower reward. Second, the
correlated equilibrium concept is built on the idea of having
a public signal for players to observe. Based on this public
signal, the player will choose the suggested decision. However,
this public signal must fulfill constrain (1). This means that
the public signal must be generated based on the payoff
vectors from all of the players. This further implies that the
payoff vectors from all of the players are public information
which violates the purpose of a game. Otherwise, this will
become a centralized system with centralized solutions. Hence,
without knowing the payoff vectors from other players, there
is no guarantee the game can reach a correlated equilibrium.
Thus, the above challenges within the correlated equilibrium
solution concept motivate us to design a public signal that
contains limited information about each of the players and
a strategy for players that guarantee them to achieve the
correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the correlated equilibrium
they achieved will also maximize each players’ reward.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
Our proposed method will be split into two major parts
correlated equilibrium distribution determination and payoff
4Figure 4: Proposed Method Process Flowchart
vectors estimation. The first part is to determine the correlated
equilibrium distribution between players and maximize the
summation of each of the player’s reward under this distri-
bution. We first provide an overview of the proposed process
in Section III-A. Then we discuss how players interact with the
environment and collect data during the interaction in Section
III-B. Next, we then discuss our proposed a policy-based deep
reinforcement learning model and the model training process
that leads players to the correlated equilibrium in Section III-C
and Section III-D, respectively. The second part is to estimate
the payoff vectors of others via our proposed mathematical
model that involves the idea of the force of tension in Section
III-E. In Section III-A, we summarize the entire process along
with the use of our proposed models.
A. Process Overview
In our system, we start with player pmain’s point of view.
This means that at this point, we only know the information
of player pmain such as player pmain’s payoff vector Vmain
and policy πmain. The process flowchart is shown in Fig. 4
and outlined as followed.
We first find the set of players Pagainst ∈ P who obtain
more than one Nash equilibrium when interacting with player
pmain. We will say the player in set Pagainst are against to
main player pmain and the rest of the players are cooperating
with player pmain. The reason we say the players in Pagainst
are against to player pmain is due to the payoff vectors of
those players are monotonously increasing in the opposite di-
rection as main player pmain. The detail on the monotonously
increasing property will be discussed in Section III-E.
Once we have set Pagainst, we will let players pmain and
pt ∈ Pagainst to interact with the system. During the interac-
tion, both players will have to try their best to cooperate but
also not to reveal too much information to others. This means
each player not only has to discover the environment but also
analyze the observed public information during the interaction.
The public signals in our system model are the players’ state
after each action they performed. This information only tells
a player what the other player’s preference for each of the
decision set Dh but does not reveal the actual payoff vector of
others. Some may argue that revealing the player’s state gives
too much information to the opponents. However, this is not
true. Take the mixed strategy for example, although no player
will know what the probabilities are been assigned to each
pure strategy by the opponents, after certain rounds of game
played, the player can base on the statistics to determine those
probabilities. Therefore, revealing the players’ states as the
public signals is valid. Along with player’s own information,
each player will learn from their experience through their
own deep neural networks which will be discussed in Section
III-C. Our proposed policy-based deep reinforcement learning
model will learn the joint distribution between two players and
lead them to the state that both players agreed on while still
obtaining a certain amount of reward.
As for the termination of the interaction, since no player
knows the payoff vector of the other player, we cannot
terminate the interaction process based on a certain expect
rewards of a player nor can we set a distribution goal to
indicate the players have reached the correlated equilibrium
distribution with an expect reward from both of the players.
Hence, the only termination condition we can set is the number
of actions the player can perform during the interaction. The
number of actions has a restriction which will be discussed
in Section III-B along with the interaction process and data
collection process. After a certain amount of interactions, we
can see that no matter how long the players interact with the
environment, they will always be ending up in the same state.
This means that the learning has been completed and they
have reached state sce where the probability distribution of
decision set D satisfied the correlated equilibrium distribution
definition and also maximize the joint rewards of both of the
players based on this distribution.
Once we get the estimated correlated equilibrium distri-
bution state sce, we can now go to the second part of our
proposed method to estimate payoff vector vˆt of player pt. In
order to estimate the payoff vectors, we proposed a method
that combined the idea of the rationality defined in the theorem
of correlated equilibrium in game theory and the idea of the
5force of tension. First, due to the fact that correlated equilib-
rium distribution is calculated with the rationality conditions
regarding the payoff vectors of both of the players, when we
calculate payoff vector Vt, the constraints still need to fulfill
the rationality conditions. Next, we can treat the probabilities
in the probability distribution as a type of preference for the
decisions for each of the players. Based on the preference,
we can determine the tension on a decision Dh between each
player. With these constraints, we can estimate payoff vector
Vt by solving a linear equation to maximize the reward of
player pt.
Once we estimate the payoff vector of player pt, we will
repeat this process until we go over each player in set Pagainst
and estimated the payoff vector for all players in set Pagainst.
As mentioned before, the player who is not in the set of
Pagainst is considered as the player whose cooperating with
main player pmian. This means these players who cooperate
with player pmain will most likely be against to player
pt ∈ Pagainst. Hence, if we can set either one of the players
in Pagainst as main player pmain, we can find the players who
are against the new main player pmain and repeat the process
until we get the payoff vector for all players. Keep in mind
that the termination condition can be triggered before each
player interacts with each other players. Hence, this means
some players will not interact with some other players at
all. However, we can still compute the correlated equilibrium
among those players simply by the correlated equilibrium
theorem that we discussed in Section II-A.
B. Data Collection
We let player pl ∈ {pmain, pt} interact with the environ-
ment for M rounds independently. In the start of each round,
player pl will always starts at the same state sdef ∈ S. From
this state, player pl will choose an action aj ∈ A to perform
according to pl’s policy πl. Once the action has been finished,
player pl will reached to another state sk ∈ S. Player pl
will than repeat the process of performing the next action and
reaching to another state until player pl obtained N states for
each round m for a total of M rounds. The number of states,
N , a player needs to obtain has to be an integer greater or
equal to
⌈
ϑ−1
⌉
. The reason is because since the player does
not know the exact state which satisfied by the other player
and each player must have the ability to discover the entire
environment. Also, since each of the probability in a state sk
is within the range of [0, 1], a minimum
⌈
ϑ−1
⌉
− 1 actions
will guarantee the player has the ability to reach any state in
the environment.
Back to the data collection process, player pl will record
the number of action ak, i.e., k, that performed at the n-th
action in round m in cl,m,n and the corresponding state in
sl,m,n along the process. Here, the choice cl,m,n is an one-
hot encode data. For example, if there are five actions in the
action set A and the player chose action a2 at the n-th action
in round m, than the choice cl,m,n = 01000. Once M rounds
of interactions have been completed, player pl will have a set
of actions’ number Cl, i.e.,
Cl =


cl,1,1 · · · cl,1,N−1
...
. . .
...
cl,M,1 · · · cl,M,N−1

 (2)
and a set of corresponding states Sl, i.e.,
Sl =


sl,1,1 · · · sl,1,N
...
. . .
...
sl,M,1 · · · sl,M,N

 . (3)
where sl,m,1 = sdef .
Once player pl has finished interacting with the environment
forM rounds, we will need to calculate the rewards that player
pl gained in each state in Sl. However, we cannot just calculate
the reward for player pl based only on Sl since for each action
that player pl done is depends not only on player pl’s policy
πl but also depends on the action of the other player. Hence,
when we calculate the reward gained in state sl,m,n, we need
to consider the n’s states in round m from the other player
where 1 ≤ m ≤M and 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The relationship between
both of the n’s states in round m from each of the players is
that those states are equally important. Hence, the final state
sˆm,n for both players will be at the middle point of both of
the n’s states in round m from both players. Thus, in order
to do determine the state sˆm,n, we need to gather both of the
state sets from each player and averaging them element-wise
to form the average state set Savg , i.e.,
Savg =


sˆ1,1 · · · sˆ1,N
...
. . .
...
sˆM,1 · · · sˆM,N

 (4)
where
sˆm,n =
1
2
∑2
l=1
sl,m,n. (5)
With the calculated average state set, we can then calculate
the reward rl,m,n that player pl gained in the each of the state
in the average state set Savg by computing the dot product of
the average state sˆm,n and the transport of the player’s payoffs
vector Vl, i.e.,
rl,m,n = sˆm,n · V
T
l . (6)
C. Policy-Based Deep Reinforcement Learning Neural Net-
work
The structure of our proposed policy-based deep reinforce-
ment learning neural network (Fig. 5) has two input layers
where the input data for the first input layer will always be a
set of states sl,m,n and the input data for the second input layer
will be a set of states sl,m,n−1 for 2 ≤ n ∈ N . With these two
input layers, the neural network can determine which direction
the player is heading to. However, before determining the
relationship between states sl,m,n and sl,m,n−1, the network
has to understand and recognize the information delivered by
the probability distributions in each of the states. Therefore,
right after each of the input layers, there is a hidden layer to
analyze the input data. After the input analyzation layers, we
6Figure 5: Policy-Based Deep Reinforcement Learning Neural Network Structure
concatenate the output of those two hidden layers with respect
to the second axis of the data.
Followed by the concatenation layer are three sequential
fully connected hidden layers. These three hidden layers are
for the neural network to determine the relationship between
the two input data. Since the difference between the two input
data might outcome some negative values, the activation func-
tion for these three hidden layers should allow negative value
to pass through. Moreover, as mentioned at the beginning of
Section III, the neural network works similarly as a classifier.
This means the output values should only be positive numbers.
Hence, the activation function for these three hidden layers are
set to the leaky rectified linear unit (Leaky ReLU), i.e.,
f (x) =
{
0.2x, for x < 0,
x, for x ≥ 0.
(7)
This allowed certain negative values to pass through and also
allowed the neural network to focus more on the positive
values to match the output values.
What follows next is also another three sequential fully
connected hidden layers. However, the difference is that the
number of units in each of these hidden layers is twice the
size of the layer in the previous three sequential hidden layers.
Also, the activation functions in these three hidden layers are
rectified linear unit (ReLU). The main purpose of these three
hidden layers is to learn the joint distribution among all of the
players in order for the deep neural network to determine the
optimal action to perform.
Finally, the output layer is a fully connected layer with J
units which is same as the number of actions in the action set
A. The activation function in the output layer is the softmax
activation function, i.e.,
f(x)i =
exi∑J
j=1 e
xj
(8)
for i = 1, . . . , J . The purpose of the softmax activation
function force the elements in the output vector to be within
the range (0, 1) and the L1-norm of the output vector is
equal to 1. In other words, the output vector represents the
probability distribution of the possible actions based on the
input states.
D. Model Training
We have discussed the structure of our proposed policy-
based deep reinforcement learning neural network in the
previous subsection where the output of the network is the
probability distribution of the actions. Now we are going to
discuss how we update the weights in the neural network.
First of all, the output of the deep learning neural network
works similarly as most of the multi-class classification but not
exactly the same. In most of the multi-class classification, the
loss function will be feed in a batch of output data along with
the corresponding one-hot encoded labels. After each training
via an optimizer, the probability for the correct predict label
will be increased. There is nothing wrong with this process.
However, most of the time, even if the input data only contains
one category, some probabilities for the incorrectly predicted
labels will also be slightly increased. As mentioned before in
Section II-B, the way we choose action ak is not based on
the arguments of the maxima among the output vector but
instead the probability distribution of the actions given by the
output vector. Hence, when we increase the probability of one
of the labels, we need to make sure the other probabilities do
not increase. Therefore, the way we achieved this property is
to calculate the loss for each of the probabilities. Here, we
use the logarithmic loss for our loss function and scale the
value by a weight. The absolute value of the weight indicates
the change rate of the probability and the sign of the weight
indicates whether should the probability move tower or away
from the target for the positive and negative sign, respectively.
The best and valid value to present as the weight for the
loss function in our system is the reward rl,m,n that we have
mentioned in Section III-B. However, we will need to perform
post-processing on the reward data in order for our model to
efficiently learn the joint distribution between the players.
7In the post-processing procedure, we first multiply the
reward rl,m,n by a discount factor γ to the power of N − n
and get r¯l,m,n, i.e.,
r¯l,m,n = γ
(N−n)rl,m,n (9)
where γ ∈ [0, 1]. This is due to the different importance of
each action that the player performed during the interaction.
Action al,m,N−1 will have more influence on which state
player pl will be ended up on than the action al,m,N−2, and
so on and so forth. In other words, we can consider actions
al,m,n for n = 1, 2, . . . , N is a time series data set since action
al,m,n will always be performed after action al,m,n−1. In other
words, al,m,N−1 will be the most recent action that player pl
performed in round m. Based on the property of time series
data, longer time horizons have much more variance as they
include more irrelevant information, while short time horizons
are biased towards only short-term gains. Hence, we need a
discount factor to reduce the variance in the data set. With the
calculated rewards r¯l,m,n, we get another set R¯.
Now, the discount factor γ has taken care of the variance
caused by the long-term gains in the data set. There is another
concern from the player’s policy πl itself. As mentioned before
in Section II-B, player pl will sample an action according to
the probability distribution given by their policy πi for the
state that the player is currently in. This means that there is a
chance that some actions will never or rarely be chosen based
on the probability distribution. The problem with using the
rewards from R¯ to update the weights of the deep learning
neural network is that the deep learning neural network will
only be increasing the probabilities for sampled actions since
reward r¯l,m,n is always positive. Hence, the probabilities for
those actions that have not been sampled or rarely sampled
will be decreased throughout the training process. In order
to overcome this problem, we will subtract the reward by
a bias. Here, the bias for the reward is designed to be the
mean µl,n of the rewards of the n-th observed state in the
M rounds of interaction. We also divided the reward by the
standard deviation σl,n of the rewards of the n-th observed
state in the M rounds of interaction. This will normalize the
data for stability purpose during the training process. The post-
processed reward rˆl,m,n ∈ Rˆ is expression as the following,
rˆl,m,n =
r¯l,m,n − µl,m
σl,m
(10)
where
σl,n =
√
1
M
∑M
m=1
(r¯l,m,n − µl,n)
2
(11)
and
µl,n =
1
M
∑M
m=1
r¯l,m,n. (12)
After calculating the loss for each of the probabilities, we
will sum up the losses and feed into the optimizer. In our
proposed deep learning neural network, we applied Adam
optimization with a learning rate of 0.001 to update the
weights. We will keep repeating the process of data collection
and model training until the player’s last state in each round
become stable before going to the next process of estimating
the payoff vector of the other players.
E. Opponent Payoff Estimation
Once we have determined the correlated equilibrium state
sce, the next step will be estimating the payoff vectors for the
other player by using the properties from both the decision
choosing rationality in game theory and the force of tension.
In addition, starting from this section, each player will do the
calculation on their own. This means there will be no more
information sharing among the players. Keep in mind that the
payoff vectors estimation process works for every player in the
system. However, as mentioned before, we will be discussing
the process in player pmain’s point of view. Therefore, we
only know the information about payoff vector Vmain and the
probability distribution that is the correlated equilibrium state
sce at this point.
First, the correlated equilibrium distribution is based on
the rational decision choosing by both of the players. The
optimal probability distribution P for both of the players is
the probability distribution that will maximize the joint reward
of both of the players instead maximize their own reward.
Therefore, under the circumstance where we know the exact
payoff vectors for both of the players, the objective function
Oold (P ) for finding the optimal probability distribution P is
expressed as follows,
max
P
Oold (P ) = P · (Vmain)
T
+ P · (Vt)
T
(13)
subject to
ρh ∈ P ≥ 0,
H∑
h=1
ρh = 1,
constraint (1).
(14)
Now we want to reverse the calculation to estimate the
payoff vectors Vt when given the optimal probability distribu-
tion P, the rationality conditions in (1) should still be fulfilled
and the objective function is still be maximizing the reward
summation of all players but based on the payoff vectors, i.e.,
max
Vt
Onew (Vt) = P · (Vt)
T
. (15)
Here, we can eliminate the reward of player pmain since it is
just a constant.
However, with (1) being the only constraint, the objective
function will only be maximizing the payoff vectors as if
each player’s decision is independent with each other. As
mentioned before, the constraint in (1) only gives a convex
hull boundary on the probability distributions over the pure
strategies. This means for each player, there will be at least one
probability distribution that will benefit himself or herself but
not necessary for others. Hence, even though the solution V¯t
will maximize the objective function Onew (Vt), the solution
V¯t will never equal to the actual payoff vectors with (1) being
the only constraint. Moreover, if we try to solve the objective
function Oold (P ) with V¯t, the optimal solution will never be
equal to P. Hence, there need to be some other constraints that
indicate the relationship between the players’ payoff vectors.
This is where the idea of the force of tension steps in.
8Figure 6: Game Setup for Payoff Vector Estimation
As mentioned before in Section II-A, a distribution is a
correlated equilibrium distribution if and only if it lies within
the convex hull based on (1). In order to get the optimal
probability distribution P, the player needs to maximize the
objective function Oold (P ). In the force of tension point of
view, we can consider optimal probability distribution P as
an equilibrium point where the tensions for each decision set
Dh from both of the players have reached an equilibrium.
Moreover, since the values in the optimal solution P are
probabilities, we can treat those probabilities as the preferences
of each decision set Dh for the players. Based on this idea, we
can list out the constraints regarding the relationship between
the rewards in the payoff vector. There are a few types of
constraints that we will be discussing in this section. For easier
understanding, starting from here, we will use the game setup
shown in Fig. 6 as the scenario where player p1 and player p2
are “Player 1” and “Player 2” in Fig. 6, respectively. Keep in
mind that we do not know the payoff vector V2 at this time.
We first need to reorder the elements in the payoff vectors
by sorting both of the payoff vectors and the probability
distribution P based on the payoff vector V1 in the ascending
order. The payoff vector V2 has to future rearrange the
elements where the first element will be move to the end of the
vector. After the reordering process, we get three new vectors
V1 → V¯1, V2 → V¯2, P→ P¯, and D→ D¯, i.e.,
V¯1 = {v¯1,1, v¯1,2, v¯1,3, v¯1,4} = {v1,4, v1,2, v1,1, v1,3} , (16)
V¯2 = {v¯2,1, v¯2,2, v¯2,3, v¯2,4} = {v2,4, v2,2, v2,1, v2,3} , (17)
P¯ = {ρ¯1, ρ¯2, ρ¯3, ρ¯4} = {ρ4, ρ2, ρ1, ρ3} , (18)
and
D¯ =
{
D¯1, D¯2, D¯3, D¯4
}
= {D4, D2, D1, D3} . (19)
The idea here is that players will try to move from the
decision set with the lowest reward to the decision set with
the highest reward where the direction for player p1 is from
the left to the right and the right to the left for player p2.
This setup is due to the monotonously increasing property for
the convex set and function. The illustration is shown in Fig.
7 where we also showed the associated decision set for each
Figure 7: Payoff Vector Reorder
reward. The arrow in the figure indicates the direction of the
force that the player puts on the decision state. With this setup,
we can start to discuss the types of conditions.
The first constraint type is regarding one outgoing force for
each decision set from each player. We look at the first decision
setDh where the corresponding rewards for both player p1 and
player p2 have an outgoing arrow. We than subtract the force
from player p1 by the force from player p2 to get the net force
~fh, i.e.,
~fh = ρ¯h+1 (v¯1,h+1 − v¯1,h)− ρ¯h−1 (v¯2,h−1 − v¯2,h) (20)
We can than list a constraint based on δ~fh where
δ~fh =


~fh ≥ 0, if ρ¯h−1 < ρ¯h ≤ ρ¯h+1,
~fh = 0, if ρ¯h−1 ≤ ρ¯h and ρ¯h+1 ≤ ρ¯h,
~fh ≤ 0, if ρ¯h−1 > ρ¯h ≥ ρ¯h+1.
(21)
The reason for different signs of outgoing net force ~fh is due
to the preference according to probability ρ¯h. Reward v¯h with
higher probability ρ¯h means it has a higher preference to the
player which also means that the player will willing to move
to from a reward with lower preference. Take reward v¯1,3 for
example. If probability ρ¯4 is greater than probabilities ρ¯3 and
ρ¯2, this means p1 will be trying to move from v¯1,3 to v¯1,4.
Since no player will be against to himself or herself, the only
force that that will be against to player p1 will came from
player p2 which is the force from v¯2,3 to v¯2,2. However, since
the preference on reward v¯2,4 for player p2 is also higher than
reward v¯2,3 and v¯2,2, player p2 will also be moving to reward
v¯2,4 as well. Therefore, the force from reward v¯1,3 to reward
v¯1,4 should be greater or equal to the force from player p2
from reward v¯2,3 to reward v¯2,4. The same idea applied on
other two signs in (21).
The second constraint type is regarding one incoming force
for each decision set from each player. We look at the first
decision set Dh where the corresponding rewards for both
player p1 and player p2 has an incoming arrow. We than
subtract the force from player p1 by the force from player
p2 to get the difference
←
f h, i.e.,
←
f h = ρ¯h (v¯1,h − v¯1,h−1)− ρ¯h (v¯2,h − v¯2,h−1) (22)
for
v¯2,h−1 =
{
v¯2,1, if h = H,
v¯2,h−1, otherwise.
(23)
We also can than list a constraint based on
←
f h where
9δ←
f h
=


←
f h ≥ 0, if ρ¯h−1 > ρ¯h ≥ ρ¯h+1,
←
f h = 0, if ρ¯h−1 ≤ ρ¯h and ρ¯h+1 ≤ ρ¯h,
←
f h ≤ 0, if ρ¯h−1 < ρ¯h ≤ ρ¯h+1.
(24)
for
ρ¯h+1 =
{
ρ¯1, if h = H,
ρ¯h−1, otherwise.
(25)
The different signs of the incoming net force
←
f h is the same
idea as we mentioned in constraint (21).
We will repeat these two types of constraints with L
continuous outgoing force for the first type constraint and
L continuous incoming force for the second type constraint
for L =
{
2, 3, . . . ,
⌊
H
2
⌋}
. Finally, we will add few more
constraints as follows,
vi,h ≥ 0, (26)
H∑
h=1
vi,h = 1, (27)
and the equality in the Nash equilibrium with the mixed
strategy has to be established.
F. Method Summary
Now we have gone through the detail of each part of our
proposed method. We can see that from our proposed method,
all players can learn the joint distribution between each other
with the policy-based deep reinforcement learning model and
reach the correlated equilibrium. The correlated equilibrium
probability distribution they reached allowed the player to
obtain the maximum reward under a rational decision making
in the game. With the correlated equilibrium probability dis-
tribution, the player can calculate the opponent’s payoff vector
based on our proposed mathematical model which involves the
idea of the force of tension. The overall process is summarized
in Algorithm 1 where we can see that not all players will
interact with all other players. However, we still can compute
the correlated equilibrium among those players who does not
have interaction at all since we already have the payoff vectors
of those players. This reduced the computation in respect of
the entire system.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
In our simulation, the game environment is setup based
on two-person game where the players are player p1 and
player p2. The decisions available to player p1 are “U” and
“D” where the decisions available to player p2 are “L” and
“R”. Therefore, the decision sets Dh for h = {1, 2, 3, 4}
are (U,L), (U,R), (D,L), and (D,R), respectively. The pay-
off vectors V1 = {0.3571, 0.4286, 0.2143, 0} and V2 =
{0.3571, 0.2143, 0.4286, 0}. The illustration of the setup is
shown in Fig. 8. The step size ϑ is set to 0.005. Therefore, the
action set A is the permutation set among the elements in each
of the three sets {−0.005, 0, 0.005}, {−0.005, 0, 0.005}, and
Algorithm 1: Overall Proposed Method
Definition:
Di,j is a set of all possible decision combination di,j,k of
all players in P except player pi and pj where i 6= j;
NEi,j,k be the set of the Nash equilibria with the mixed
strategy between player pi and player pj when other
players decision is fixed to di,j,k;
Statement f (pi, πi) indicates player pi will interact with
the environment with policy πi based on pi’s DNN to
obtain N states for M rounds and return Ci and Si;
Function ℜ
(
Sˆ, Vi
)
calculates the post-processed reward
set Rˆi for player pi;
Initialization:
ℑ = ∅
for each pi ∈ P do
for each pj ∈ P AND i 6= j do
for each di,j,k ∈ Di,j do
if {pj, pi, dj,i,k} /∈ ℑ then
ℑ append {pi, pj , di,j,k};
end
end
end
end
while ℑ 6= ∅ do
for {pi, pj, di,j,k} in ℑ do
Other players’ decision set to di,j,k;
if Vi OR Vj is known then
if size(NEmain,i,di,j,k ) ≥ 2 then
if Vi is known then
pm = pi and pa = pj;
else
pm = pj and pa = pi;
end
P˜ = ∅
while P˜ not stable do
Cm, Sm = f (pm, πm);
Ca, Sa = f (pa, πa);
Sˆ = 0.5 (Sm + Sa);
Rˆm = ℜ
(
Sˆ, Vm
)
;
Rˆa = ℜ
(
Sˆ, Va
)
;
Update πm with Cm, Sm, and Rˆm;
Update πi with Ca, Sa, and Rˆa;
P˜ = Sˆ [−1];
end
Set proposed constraints;
Maximize O
(
V˜a
)
with respect to V˜a;
end
Remove {pi, pj, di,j,k} from ℑ;
end
end
end
Compute correlated equilibrium among players with V;
{−0.005, 0, 0.005} which has total of 27 actions. The player
will interact with the environment for M = 40 rounds and
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Figure 8: Simulation Setup
Figure 9: Average Reward Gained in Each Epoch
will perform N = 200 actions in each round.
B. Numerical Results
With the setup of our simulation, we let the player p1 be
the main player. This means, at this point, we only know the
payoff vector V1 but not the payoff vector V2. However, in
order to illustrate the relation between both players, we will
also show the data from player p2 in the later on figures.
We first let two players interact with the environment for
more than 300 epochs where the player interacts 40 rounds
in each epoch. As we can see in Fig. 9, both players are
gaining small and unstable rewards at the beginning. As they
interact with the environment with their own policy-based deep
reinforcement learning neural network in each epoch, they
learn from the environment and the opponent and receiving
higher rewards as the number of epochs increases. In addition,
as the more they learned, the faster they reach the higher
reward. The results were shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 for
player p1 and player p2, respectively. However, around 80
epochs where they reach mixed Nash equilibrium, they started
to diverge from each other. More specifically, player p2 starts
Figure 10: Player 1 Reward Increasing After Learning
Figure 11: Player 2 Reward Increasing After Learning
to pull player p1 tower decision set D2 = (U,R). Around
epoch 130, player p1 realizes that he or she must act to stop
the reduction on his or her reward. Hence, player p1 starts to
pull back player p2. Around epoch 170, both players reach
an equilibrium point where the state at the end of each round
of interaction was stabled at
{
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
}
. In Fig. 12, we can
see the track of the interaction from both players in different
epochs where the areas of “CS”, “CE”, and “NE” represent
the set of correlated strategies, the convex hull of the Nash
equilibrium, and the convex hull of correlated equilibrium,
respectively. We can see that as they observe the environment
and learn the opponent’s behavior, they achieve outside of
the Nash equilibrium convex hull and become stable at the
correlated equilibrium where maximizes both players’ reward.
Even though we simulate more than 500 epochs, the finial
state remains stable after epoch 170. Hence, we only showed
the result of up to 300 epochs in each figure.
Once the both players have reached a stable state after well
trained, we use this state as the estimate correlated equilibrium
probability distribution where P˜ =
{
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
}
to determine
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Figure 12: Track of Both Players After Learning
Figure 13: Three Players Game
the estimate payoff table for player p2. Moreover, if we
calculate the correlated equilibrium with the objective function
(13), we can see that the solution P =
{
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
}
is exactly
the same as the probability distribution in state s.
With the estimate correlated equilibrium probability dis-
tribution P˜, we are able to list out the objective function
and the constraints based on the steps in Section III-E. By
solving this constrained linear multivariable function, we get
the estimate payoff vector V˜2 = {0.4167, 0.5000, 0.0833, 0}
of player p2. Compare with the actual payoff vector V2 =
{0.4167, 0.5000, 0.0833, 0}, we can see that there is no er-
ror between these two vectors. Hence, we have successfully
computed the payoff vector for the other player.
In the beginning, the players can only apply the mixed
strategy to reach the Nash equilibrium and obtain the reward
0.25 and 0.25 for player p1 and player p2, respectively. Now,
with our proposed deep reinforcement learning model, both
players can obtain a higher reward of 0.3333 and 0.3333 for
player p1 and player p2, respectively, by reaching the estimated
correlated equilibrium.
Now, in the case that we have three players in the game
as shown in Fig. 13 where player three p3 can choose left or
right matrix they will be playing. With player p3 chooses the
left matrix, we will do the same thing as before where we let
player p1 interact with player p2 and get the payoff vector V2.
However, we will also let either player p1 interact with player
p3. By doing so, we can get the payoff vector V3. By having
the payoff vectors V2 and V3, we can compute the correlated
equilibrium between player p2 and player p3 without them to
interact with each other. The same thing for the case where
player p3 chooses the right matrix. This way, we reduced the
computation of the interaction between player p2 and player
p3 in the entire process.
V. DISCUSSION OF APPLICATION SCENARIOS
The correlated equilibrium solution concept has been
adopted in many different areas. However, most of them still
relied on either a centralized system or information sharing
between parties. In this section, we will be discussing the
applications that involve the correlated equilibrium in wireless
communication, smart grid, and resource allocation, where
our proposed scheme can reduce signaling and improve the
performance.
We first look at the applications in wireless communication
where the most common wireless technologies use radio
waves. With radio waves, the transmission distances can be as
short as few centimeters such as NFC and as far as millions
of miles for deep-space radio communications. However, there
are some challenges in wireless communication as signal inter-
ference, data throughput, and more need to be solved in order
to have a stable communication between devices. The author
in [14] proposed a distributed cooperation policy selection
scheme for interference to perform subcarrier assignment for
uplink multi-cell OFDMA systems by adopting the correlated
equilibrium solution concept that achieves better performance
by allowing each user to consider the joint distribution among
users’ actions to minimize the interference. Also, in [15],
the author showed by using a game-theoretic learning al-
gorithm which is based on correlation equilibrium in the
problem of multi-user multichannel access in distributed high-
frequency diversity communication networks can completely
avoid interference and get optimal throughput. Moreover, it
also guarantees fairness among all user equipment. Besides
the concerns on the interference in wireless communication,
the data throughput is also a main concern as well. In the
work [16], the author showed a game-theoretic approach based
on correlated equilibrium and regret-matching learning can
provide significant gains in terms of average cell throughput
in the Monte Carlo simulations of Long Term Evolution -
Advanced like system.
Next, the smart grid is an electrical grid that includes a
variety of operation and energy measures including smart
meters, smart appliances, renewable energy resources, and
energy-efficient resources [17]. Electronic power conditioning
and control of the production and distribution of electricity are
important aspects of the smart grid [18]. In energy-aware ad
hoc networks, energy efficiency is a crucial requirement. The
authors in [19] present a cooperative behavior control scheme
based on the correlated equilibrium to reduce and balance
energy consumption.
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Finally, in resource allocation problem which arises in
many application domains ranging from the social sciences
to engineering [20], [21], the objective is to allocate resources
to different areas under some concerns such as energy con-
sumption, fairness, and more. In [22], the authors proposed
an energy-efficient resource allocation scheme by using the
correlated equilibrium. Furthermore, the authors present a
linear programming method and a distributed algorithm based
on the regret matching procedure to implement the CE. With
their proposed method, they can determine the desired resource
allocation in an uplink orthogonal frequency division multiple
access (OFDMA) system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have successfully overcome the issue re-
garding the public signal in the correlated equilibrium solution
concept through our proposed deep reinforcement learning
model. We can see from the numerical results that the model
learned the joint distribution of all the players and reached
the state of the correlated equilibrium probability distribution.
Moreover, with the information from the player himself or
herself and the correlated equilibrium probability distribution,
achieved from the deep reinforcement learning model, we
propose a mathematical model to estimate the payoff vector of
the other player, which combines the concept of the rationality
in game theory and the force of tension. Once we have the
estimated payoff vectors of other players, we can compute
the correlated equilibrium among the player and the other
players who have not been interacted with each other. This
paper combines the game theory with machine learning in the
sense that the proposed machine learning learns what is the
game player’s payoff, instead of just categorizing the strategies
of actions according to the current situation.
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